India's population problem: why our fertility decline demands a country-wide policy response

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The speed at which India is undergoing a structural demographic transformation will have far-reaching consequences.(AFP)

Summary

The Sample Registration System (SRS) report of 2024 confirms the pace at which the country's total fertility rate (TFR) is dropping. While India is diverse, with big differences between states, we must debate and frame a policy on tackling our overall demographic decline.

India’s fertility story first reached a turning point five years ago, when the National Family Health Survey-5 for 2019-2021 showed the country’s total fertility rate (TFR) had fallen to 2. The average number of children a woman bears was below the standard replacement rate of 2.1 half a decade ago.

Last week, the Sample Registration System (SRS) Statistical Report for 2024, published by the Office of the Registrar General of India, revealed the pace of decline. In 2024, our national TFR fell to a little under 1.9.

The speed at which we are undergoing a structural demographic transformation will have consequences for the economy, labour market, healthcare system and social dynamics.

The TFR measures the average number of children a woman would have over her lifetime at current birth rates. Globally, this replacement level is cited as 2.1 children per woman, but in India the figure is reckoned by some to be slightly higher at 2.15, given a distortion in the country’s sex ratio at birth (SRB) caused by troubling gender-selection practices.

According to the latest SRS report, India’s SRB stands at 918 females per 1,000 males, a marginal improvement from 907 in the 2018 to 2020 period, but still skewed. Since fewer girls are born, more births per woman are required for population stability. But our TFR is likely to slide further.

In 1985, India’s TFR was 4.3 and has fallen at a rate of about 0.06 per year and there is no sign that this decline will reverse. At the current pace, our TFR is projected to drop below 1.6 by 2031, America’s current level. By that point, the fertility gap relative to replacement will be so substantial that a headcount contraction in time to come would look unavoidable.

However, the national TFR figure masks regional differences. India does not have one demographic story. It has many.

Kerala’s TFR at 1.3 is approaching the levels of Italy and Spain, societies that have been grappling with a demographic decline for decades. Delhi, as a metropolitan anomaly, records an even lower TFR of 1.2, although its unique migration dynamics make direct comparison with states difficult. At the other end of the range, Bihar’s TFR is at 2.9, above the replacement rate and reflective of differing social, educational and economic conditions.

The distance between Kerala and Bihar is not merely geographical. It represents perhaps a whole generation’s demographic transition.

The rural-urban divide tells a similar story. While India’s rural TFR was 2.1 in 2024, its urban TFR dropped to 1.5. As urbanization continues and rural areas increasingly adopt urban economic patterns and social norms, this split also suggests we should expect a decline. The urban figure may be a preview of India’s demographic future.

The 2024 SRS report extends beyond fertility data, offering a comprehensive picture of India’s vital statistics.

Infant mortality: This rate has declined to 24 deaths per 1,000 live births, a drop of six points over five years. Kerala leads the nation with a rate of just 8, a figure comparable to developed economies. For children under age five, the 2024 rate was 28 per 1,000 live births.

Crude death rate: The SRS puts it at 6.4 in 2024, which is still higher than pre-covid levels.

Causes of death: Two of these have recorded notable increases. Deaths from motor vehicle accidents account for 3.2% of total deaths, while deaths by suicide make up 2.8%. Both warrant serious attention.

Headcount outlook: India’s population will continue to grow in absolute terms for some years. We have population momentum: a large cohort of working age adults will continue to have children, fewer than previous generations but enough to sustain numeric growth, while life expectancy continues to rise.

These two forces will together delay an absolute population decline. But the TFR drop is bound to show up,as the family-size choices made today will determine the size of India’s working age population between 2045 and 2060.

We can expect a shrunk workforce even as pension systems and the like come under strain; an ageing society may place other demands on India’s fiscal apparatus as well.

A clearer demographic picture will emerge once new Census data is published next year.

India’s TFR decline is part of a wider global story. The rate has been observed to decline in line with economic development, female education and urbanization. The same pattern is evident in Japan, South Korea and China to Brazil, Iran and European countries.

Whether India can chart a unique path that will lead to a different destination is unclear. Our fertility data from 1985 to 2024 describes a straight downtrend. State intervention by way of pro-natalist policies in other countries has proven ineffective.

If anything, what’s debatable is how rapidly India’s TFR will drop, what level it might eventually stabilize at (if it does) and how regional patterns will converge. Apart from Bihar, only Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Chhattisgarh and Rajasthan had above-2.1 TFRs in 2024.

India needs an in-depth conversation on its demographic inflection. The SRS Statistical Report has provided updated data. An analysis, a debate and then a policy response must follow.

The author is a technology and social entrepreneur from IIT Kharagpur and tweets as @ipravinkaushal.

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