India’s push to arm itself with its own products could spell a variety of strategic gains

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A domestic industrial base not only ensures continuity of supply, but also enables doctrinal flexibility and technological adaptation. (istockphoto)

Summary

India is clear that its pursuit of a robust domestic defence industrial base is integral to strategic autonomy. While an emphasis on capability building for self sufficiency is crucial in today’s times, the spillover effects would be valuable too.

In a world marked by persistent turbulence, the character of globalization is undergoing a decisive shift.

Supply chains, once celebrated as instruments of efficiency, are now being used as tools of strategic leverage. Energy markets are volatile, shipping routes face disruptions and critical technologies are being subject to export controls.

For India, which is heavily dependent on imported energy, these developments underline a structural fragility. The risks extend to defence preparedness, where dependence on foreign suppliers for spares and systems can quickly turn into operational constraints during crises. It is in this context that defence reforms gain urgency.

For decades, a significant proportion of India’s defence requirements were met externally, reflecting a procurement architecture that privileged established foreign vendors over domestic capability creation.

The shift underway, however, signals a more purposeful approach. Policy instruments such as the Defence Acquisition Procedure 2020 and the draft Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP) 2026, along with targeted indigenization lists and liberalized investment norms, are rebalancing the ecosystem. The emphasis is no longer merely on acquisition, but on capability development.

The results are noteworthy: rising domestic production, exports and roles for private industry. Notably, the credibility of India’s ambition of emerging as a significant defence manufacturing hub is no longer in question.

The rationale for this shift is fundamentally strategic. In an era of fluid alignments, dependence on external suppliers carries inherent risks. The experience of sanctions and supply disruptions in recent conflicts has reinforced the importance of self-reliance.

A domestic industrial base not only ensures continuity of supply, but also enables doctrinal flexibility and technological adaptation. The economic logic is equally compelling. Defence manufacturing has strong multiplier effects, stimulating a wide network of ancillary industries and generating high-skilled employment. The involvement of small and medium firms, in particular, reflects the broadening of the industrial base, with implications for both innovation and employment generation.

Equally significant is the technological dimension. Indigenous research and development creates pathways for dual-use innovation, with spillover effects across sectors such as aerospace, electronics and advanced materials.

As India’s export profile expands, it also enhances the country’s strategic outreach, particularly in the Global South. Defence exports in this context become an instrument of economic as well as diplomatic engagement.

It is in this broader context that defence industrial corridors assume salience in India’s strategic calculus. Conceived not merely as industrial parks but as integrated ecosystems, these corridors are designed to align policy ambition with on-ground capability. They aim to compress the distance between design, development, testing and manufacturing, an area where India has historically struggled.

The Uttar Pradesh Defence Industrial Corridor, in particular, illustrates how spatial clustering can be leveraged to build depth in a sector long characterized by external dependence.

Anchored across multiple nodes—Agra, Aligarh, Lucknow, Kanpur, Jhansi and Chitrakoot—the corridor is an attempt to distribute industrial growth while maintaining strategic coherence. Each node is envisaged to specialize in distinct segments of the defence value chain, thereby avoiding duplication and encouraging complementarity.

This multi-nodal architecture also mitigates regional imbalances in the state, embedding defence manufacturing within a broader developmental framework. In doing so, the corridor is not just an industrial initiative, but a vehicle for economic transformation.

Equally significant is the governance model underpinning it. Improved connectivity via expressways and logistics networks reduces transaction costs while single-window clearance mechanisms address bureaucratic inertia. The emphasis on proactive engagement with industry—rather than passive regulation—marks a subtle but important shift in the state’s approach to industrial policy.

Perhaps the most consequential outcome lies in the clustering effect of the corridor. The co-location of anchor firms alongside a network of small firms and ancillary suppliers helps develop an integrated value chain.

Such clustering has the potential to correct a long-standing structural weakness in India’s defence sector: the disconnect between design, production and supply ecosystems. It can foster not only efficiencies of scale, but also a culture of innovation and collaboration, which are key for building a globally competitive defence industrial base.

To be sure, challenges—from technological gaps to regulatory bottlenecks—constrain progress. Yet, the evolution of the corridor suggests that incremental but sustained reforms can yield tangible outcomes.

The broader lesson is that self-reliance is not an event but a process, requiring alignment between policy, industry and vision. As global uncertainties deepen, India’s choices will carry greater consequences. The pursuit of a robust domestic defence industrial base is not simply about economic gain; it is integral to strategic autonomy. Initiatives such as the Uttar Pradesh corridor recognize this reality.

The challenge now is to sustain the momentum, deepen reforms and ensure that ambition is matched by execution.

The author is professor of international relations, King’s College London, and vice president for studies at Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.

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