Thucydides in Greece to Carney in Davos: What does India make of insights from ancient times?

In his view, this rupture is real and irrevocable and demands both individual and collective action by “middle powers." Deservingly, he has been praised for his courage and clear-headed reading of realpolitik. Carney suggested that Thucydides’s aphorism that “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must" need not be considered inevitable in this new order.

Writing about 2,400 years ago, Thucydides, a historian and general in ancient Greece, offered profound insights into the nuanced interplay of national power and human nature. In his work, History of the Peloponnesian War, he delves into the conflict between Athens (a naval great power) and Sparta (a land-based great power).

Through a series of dialogues and debates, he showcases the nature of discourse between Athens and other Greek city-states of the time. In the Melian dialogue, for instance, he presents Athens as an unapologetic hegemon and the neutral state of Melos as a principled though naïve city-state. The Mytilenean debate features two Athenian politicians with differing points of view arguing about whether to eliminate the entire population of Mytilene.

A critical and deep reading of Thucydides reveals that he had a nuanced view of the use of power. He did believe that fear, honour and self-interest were the primary drivers of human nature and international relationships. He also believed that the consequences of disregarding moral imperatives led to conflicts, humanitarian crises and a loss of credibility.

In his speech, Carney invited all middle powers to form a coalition that would join together to deal with the rupture he spoke of. This affords a pragmatic middle-ground between pursuing national self-interest and international relationships based on values.

This notion is a page drawn directly from Thucydides. Sparta leveraged its military capabilities and also formed a coalition called the Peloponnesian League with formidable allies to defend against Athenian expansion. Thucydides believed that these types of alliances were critical and the only way to effectively counter a great power; he also considered them subject to shifting loyalties.

Thomas Hobbes, who wrote the famous book Leviathan, is cut from the same cloth as Thucydides. In 1639, Hobbes produced the first English translation of The History of the Peloponnesian War. Echoing Thucydides, Hobbes suggested that human nature was driven by fear, glory and competition. Both see strength and power as necessary but ultimately self-defeating when they go unchecked.

As the US declined to rule out the use of force in its attempted takeover of Greenland, the middle powers of Denmark, France, Germany and Canada backed its territorial integrity. Going beyond rhetoric, many of them also moved military forces to Greenland. If push had indeed come to shove, they were ready to invoke Article 5, the collective defence clause of Nato. The rest of Nato against America would indeed have ruptured the trans-Atlantic alliance. At Davos, however, Trump climbed down. For now, Nato survives.

Carney asserted that we have entered a world of great power rivalry with few constraints. To be sure, we are in a period of ‘manthan’ or churn. While the old order may indeed be dead, it is unclear what the character of the new one will be. US President Donald Trump in Greenland and Chinese President Xi Jinping with rare earth metals are discovering that the threat of the use of power is more effective than its actual use. But once this leverage is used, it tends to lose its potency.

Carney has warned against being complacent about this, but one possibility is that we do indeed return to a modified multilateral world order. This may involve stricter rules on immigration and a greater tolerance of self-interest. Some institutions like the International Monetary Fund and United Nations Security Council could reform and continue, while others like the World Bank and International Court of Justice could wither or die.

An alternative is that we move fully into great power rivalry with middle powers aligned as they each deem fit on issues. Most post-war institutions would no longer be needed. Several specialized agencies of the UN, such as those set up for health, labour and food and agriculture, would lose their relevance. Uncertainty would surround the cost of trade. Will there be relief from frictions? Would they settle at a more benign level, even if that is higher than the base of recent decades?

For quite some time, India has fashioned its foreign policy as a swing power in the same way as Carney described. It has aligned with the Global South including China on issues of agricultural trade for instance and with the West on issues of military strategy in the Indo-Pacific.

India has friendly relations with both democratic countries and non-democratic ones like the UAE, Russia and Iran. It is a founding member of Brics and an enthusiastic member of the G-20. Contrary to what Carney said, in the event of full-blown great power rivalry, middle powers like India may not have the luxury of retaining their issue-based alignment.

P.S: “History is philosophy teaching by example," said Thucydides.

The author is chairman, InKlude Labs. Read Narayan’s Mint columns at www.livemint.com/avisiblehand